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Abstract 
From 1980 until 2007, U.S. average hours worked increased by thirteen percent, due to a 
large increase in female hours. At the same time, the U.S. labor wedge, measured as the 
discrepancy between a representative household’s marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labor, declined substantially. We 
examine these trends in a model with heterogeneous households: married couples, single 
males and single females. Our quantitative analysis shows that the shrinking gender wage 
gaps and increasing labor income taxes observed in U.S. data are key determinants of 
hours and the labor wedge. Changes in our model’s labor wedge are driven by 
distortionary taxes and non-distortionary factors, such as cross-sectional differences in 
households’ labor supply and productivity. We conclude that the labor wedge measured 
from a representative household model partly reflects imperfect household aggregation. 
JEL classification: E24, H20, H31, J22 
Bank classification: Labour markets; Economic models; Potential output 
Résumé 
De 1980 à 2007, le nombre moyen d’heures travaillées aux États-Unis s’est accru de 
13  % en raison de la forte hausse du nombre des heures effectuées par les femmes. 
Parallèlement, l’écart entre le taux marginal de substitution consommation-loisir d’un 
ménage représentatif et la productivité marginale du travail a diminué de façon marquée. 
Les auteurs examinent ces tendances au moyen d’un modèle comportant des agents 
hétérogènes, soit des couples mariés, des hommes célibataires et des femmes célibataires. 
L’analyse quantitative montre que le rétrécissement des écarts salariaux hommes-femmes 
et l’augmentation des impôts sur le revenu du travail que font ressortir les données 
américaines sont des déterminants clés du nombre d’heures travaillées et de l’écart 
observé entre le taux marginal de substitution consommation-loisir et la productivité 
marginale du travail. Dans le modèle, les variations de cet écart s’expliquent par la 
présence de distorsions fiscales et d’autres facteurs qui ne sont pas sources de distorsions, 
telles les différences transversales dans l’offre de travail et la productivité des ménages. 
Les auteurs concluent que l’écart entre le taux marginal de substitution et la productivité 
marginale du travail mesuré à partir d’un modèle à agent représentatif traduit en partie 
l’agrégation imparfaite des ménages. 
Classification JEL : E24, H20, H31, J22 
Classification de la Banque : Marchés du travail; Modèles économiques; Production 
potentielle 
 1 Introduction
From the early 1980st o2007, U.S. average hours worked, deﬁned as the total hours worked
in the marketplace relative to the population of working age, increased by thirteen percent.
During the same time period, the U.S. labor wedge, measured as the discrepancy between
a representative household’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
and the marginal product of labor, declined substantially. In this paper, we show that
allowing for heterogeneous households in an otherwise standard growth model is key in
accounting for these trends.
In many models used to analyze changes in hours worked, an intratemporal labor equilib-
rium condition governs the time allocation decision. This condition, which equates the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure (MRS) to the marginal product
of labor (MPL), typically does not hold in the data. Consequently, these models’ predictions
for hours worked do not match the data. Mulligan (2002), Prescott (2004), and Ohanian,
Raﬀo, and Rogerson (2008) show that the discrepancy measured in the data between the
MRS and the MPL–the labor wedge–can partly be accounted for by taxes. For many
countries, taking changes in consumption and labor income tax rates into account improves
the model’s predictions for hours worked.1 The U.S. is an exception. As shown in the stud-
ies cited above, the increase in U.S. average hours worked and the decline in the U.S. labor
wedge are puzzling from the perspective of a standard neoclassical growth model because
they were accompanied by a signiﬁcant increase in labor income taxes. Given higher taxes,
the model predicts lower hours worked, and a higher labor wedge.2
1For example, Prescott (2004) and Ohanian, Raﬀo, and Rogerson (2008) show that most of the variations
in hours worked over time and across countries can be accounted for by diﬀerences in taxes. The tax rate
used in their analysis for each country is a combination of consumption and labor income taxes, and is
referred to as the eﬀective tax rate on labor income (for more details, see Section 4.1). High levels of hours
worked are typically observed in countries or in periods of time in which eﬀective labor income taxes are
low. One of the exceptions pointed out in the literature are Scandinavian countries where both tax rates and
hours worked are high (see Ragan (2006) and Rogerson (2007)). Another exception–the U.S. experience
since the 1960s–is analyzed in this paper.
2Several hypotheses have been put forward in order to reconcile the counterfactual predictions of the
neoclassical growth model. Prescott (2004) suggests that the ﬂattening of the income tax rate schedule in
the 1980s plays an important role in accounting for the increase in U.S. labor supply. He conjectures that
2In this paper, we depart from the representative household assumption of the neoclassical
growth model to examine the observed trends in U.S. hours and the labor wedge. Our analysis
is motivated by the fact that all of the trend increase in U.S. market hours is due to women.
Married women’s hours more than doubled since the early 1960s, while the hours of single
women rose slightly. In contrast, the hours of single and married men declined. We augment
the neoclassical growth model by allowing for gender and marital status heterogeneity and
consider the importance of several factors for hours and the labor wedge: reductions in
gender wage gaps, increases in labor income taxes, changes in government consumption and
changes in population.3 All of these factors are exogenous to the model and measured from
U.S. data for the period 1960 to 2007.4 We ﬁnd that reductions in gender wage gaps are
key in accounting for the increase in women’s hours, the increase in aggregate hours and the
decline in the labor wedge. These model predictions arise in spite of the increase in taxes.
The early 1980s marked a dramatic change for U.S. aggregate hours and the labor wedge.
While both measures were fairly constant for the twenty years prior to 1980, afterwards
hours increased and the labor wedge decreased signiﬁcantly (see Figure 1). Our model’s
predictions are consistent with both pre- and post-1980 facts.
In our model, married couples, single women and single men make decisions on how
to allocate their time between working in the marketplace and leisure. Women receive a
lower hourly wage rate compared to men, due to lower productivity and discrimination
reductions in the marginal tax rate for two-earner households led to the observed rise in female participation
and thus a rise in aggregate labor supply. However, Bar and Leukhina (2009) show that the tax reforms of
1980s had only a small eﬀect on married females participation and conclude that other factors were more
important. Ohanian, Raﬀo, and Rogerson (2008) suggest that changes in time devoted to home production
may be important for the U.S. We discuss this in more detail in Section 5.2.
3In our numerical experiments, the gender wage gap for singles diﬀers from the one for married couples,
consistent with U.S. data. Moreover, we include both consumption and labor income taxes in our analysis
in the measurement of the eﬀective tax rate on labor income (as discussed in Section 4.1).
4Taxes, government consumption and population are typically treated as exogenous inputs in macroeco-
nomic models. A few studies in the literature endogenize the gender wage gap. Erosa, Fuster, and Restuccia
(2002, 2005) endogenize the married women’s gender wage gap, by relating it to the human capital lost after
child birth. In Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) the gender wage gap is partly endogenous, due to
human capital decisions, and partly exogenous, due to direct wage discrimination or to the existence of a
“glass ceiling” that keeps women from rising in the hierarchy of organizations.
3(as suggested by Goldin (1992)). Moreover, the labor income of all households is taxed.5
The gender wage gap for single and married couples and labor income taxes are important
determinants of hours worked and the labor wedge in the model. Shrinking gender wage
gaps lead women to work more hours, while higher taxes result in lower hours worked for all
households. In order to derive the model’s implications for the labor wedge, we aggregate
the intratemporal labor equilibrium conditions of all men and women in our model. The
analytical expression obtained shows that the labor wedge depends not only on taxes, as
suggested in previous studies, but also on other labor market variables such as gender wage
gaps, female labor supply and aggregate labor supply. Higher taxes lead to an increase in
the labor wedge, while shrinking gender wage gaps (reﬂecting lower discrimination or higher
productivity of women or a combination of the two) result in a lower labor wedge. In our
quantitative experiments, we evaluate the relative importance of these opposing forces for
hours worked and the labor wedge.
A calibrated version of our baseline model–with gender wage gaps, taxes, government
consumption and population measured from U.S. data–accounts for 63 percent of the in-
crease in average hours worked and 86 percent of the increase in married women’s hours.
The baseline model accounts for about 30 percent of the decline in the U.S. labor wedge.
We perform additional experiments to isolate the quantitative importance of each factor
and show that the increase in hours and the decline in the labor wedge are driven by the
shrinking of the gender wage gaps. Moreover, a model with changes in taxes alone is unable
to account for any of the changes in U.S. hours or the labor wedge, consistent with previous
studies.
We consider some extensions of our analysis and their implications for hours. Following
5In our quantitative experiments, the eﬀective labor income tax (deﬁn e da si nf o o t n o t e1 )i st h es a m ef o r
singles and married individuals, as well as for men and women. We have constructed estimates of average
income taxes for single men, single women, married men and married women using the methodology in
Kryvtsov and Ueberfeldt (2007). We ﬁnd that while the level of the tax varies slightly, the increase in the
income tax between 1961 and 2001 is comparable across groups. Moreover, as discussed in footnote 2, Bar
and Leukhina (2009) ﬁnd that the tax reforms of 1980sh a v eas m a l le ﬀect on married females participation.
For these reasons, we do not consider diﬀerent tax rates for the diﬀerent households in our model.
4Attanasio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos (2008), we augment our model in order to quantify the
impact of decreasing child care costs on women’s labor supply. We ﬁnd that reductions in
this cost lead to increases in married women’s hours and in aggregate hours. Quantitatively,
this complements the predictions obtained from a model without child care costs, although
we ﬁnd the shrinking of the gender wage gaps to be more important. Moreover, we discuss
the importance of taking into account changes in home production and leisure time, as
suggested by Ohanian, Raﬀo, and Rogerson (2008). We show that while it helps improve
the predictions of the model, this mechanism alone cannot account for all of the changes in
U.S. hours.
As highlighted earlier, the increase in taxes observed in the U.S. economy hurts our
model’s predictions for both hours and the labor wedge. A variation of our baseline model
in which taxes are held constant accounts for virtually all of the increase in aggregate and
women’s hours. In spite of very good predictions for hours, this experiment accounts for only
two-thirds of the decline in the labor wedge. Our model is unable to account for all of the
decline in the labor wedge, since it has diﬃculty capturing the increase in the consumption
to output ratio observed in the U.S. since the mid 1980s.
Our paper makes two main contributions. First, we quantitatively evaluate the impor-
tance of shrinking gender wage gaps and increasing labor income taxes for U.S. labor supply.
In doing so, we contribute to the existing literature that has highlighted the importance of
gender wage gaps alone to women’s labor supply (see e.g., Goldin (1992), Jones, Manuelli,
and McGrattan (2003), Bar and Leukhina (2008) and Attanasio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos
(2008)). Second, we show that the labor wedge measured from a representative household
model partly reﬂects imperfect household aggregation. Some previous papers in the liter-
ature interpret the labor wedge as an indicator of labor market distortions such as taxes,
monopoly power, sticky wages, or search frictions (see e.g., Mulligan (2002), Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan (2007), Shimer (2009)). In our heterogenous household model, the labor
wedge is partly due to labor market distortions, such as taxes and discrimination, but partly
5due to non-distortionary factors, such as cross-sectional diﬀerences in households’ labor sup-
ply and productivity. Our quantitative results conﬁrm the ﬁnding that taxes do not help
account for the decline in the U.S. labor wedge since the 1980s. Rather, it is changes in the
relative productivity of men and women and changes in discrimination that contribute to
reductions in the labor wedge.
While our paper focuses on long-run trends in hours and the labor wedge, many papers
analyzing the labor wedge have focused on short-run ﬂuctuations. For example, Parkin
(1988) and Hall (1997) consider models with time-varying preferences and attribute changes
i nt h el a b o rw e d g et os h i f t si np r e f e r e n c e s .C h ari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) show that in
order to understand economic ﬂuctuations in the U.S. it is important to understand changes
in the labor wedge along with changes in total factor productivity.6 Shimer (2009, 2010)
shows that the labor wedge rises in recessions and that models with search frictions and real
wage rigidities generate an endogenous cyclical wedge between the MRS and the MPL.
Chang and Kim (2007) show that a heterogeneous-agent model economy with incomplete
capital markets and indivisible labor is able to generate a labor wedge that has similar
cyclical properties to the labor wedge measured from U.S. aggregate data. They suggest
that part of the labor wedge is due to imperfect aggregation across diﬀerent households, as
we show here, in our analysis of the U.S. economy from the early 1960st o2007.7
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the trend changes in U.S. hours
and the labor wedge. We highlight that taking heterogeneity of the population into account is
important in accounting for these trends. Section 3 presents our baseline model with gender
and marital status heterogeneity. We derive the analytical expression for the model’s labor
wedge and discuss brieﬂy the model’s predictions for hours and the labor wedge. Section 4
presents the quantitative experiments and results. In Section 5, we consider other factors–
6Several other studies underscore the importance of the labor wedge in understanding economic ﬂuc-
tuations. See, for example, Ahearne, Kydland, and Wynne (2006) for a study of Ireland’s recession in the
1980s, Kersting (2008) for a study of the 1980s recession in the United Kingdom, or Chakraborty (2009) for
an analysis of the labor wedge in Japan’s lost decade during the 1990s.
7Cociuba and Ueberfeldt (2008) analyze the Canadian labor wedge since the early 1960s. They show
that the decline in the labor wedge can be tied to reductions in the gender wage gaps observed in Canada.
6such as changes in child care costs, leisure time and time devoted to home production–and
discuss their relative importance for the trends observed in U.S. hours and the labor wedge.
We conclude in Section 6.
2 U.S. Data and a Simple Static Model
In this section, we document trends in U.S. hours and the labor wedge. We use a simple model
to highlight that taking into account heterogeneity of the population is key in understanding
these trends.
2.1 A Look at U.S. Data
The changes in the aggregate weekly hours worked in the U.S. economy from 1961 to 2007
are documented in the upper left panel of Figure 1 (see Appendix A.1 for details on the
data sources and computations). Throughout the 1960sa n dt h e1970s, the U.S. working-age
population worked, on average, 25 hours per week. Beginning in the early 1980s, aggregate
hours increased steadily to 28 hours per week in 2007.8 T h eu p p e rr i g h tp a n e lo fF i g u r e1
plots the average weekly hours worked for males and females, by marital status. We see
that the increase in aggregate hours is driven by women. In 1961, married men worked an
average of 39 hours per week, while single men worked 28 hours, single women worked 22
hours and married females worked only 10 hours. By 2007, men’s hours declined by 4 to 10
percent, while women’s hours increased. The largest increase was in the hours of married
women, which more than doubled over the 47 year period. These diﬀerences in the hours
worked by men and women motivate our model in Section 3.
The bottom panel of Figure 1 plots the labor wedge for the U.S. economy, normalized to
equal 1 in year 1961. We follow the literature and measure the labor wedge as a discrepancy
8U.S. aggregate hours worked have declined during the recent recession, dated to start in December 2007
by the NBER. The changes in hours observed during these last few years are interesting in their own right,
but are not analyzed in this paper.
7between the representative household in a neoclassical growth model and the aggregate U.S.
data (see e.g., Parkin (1988), Hall (1997), Mulligan (2002), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2007) and Shimer (2009)). In particular, we start with the static model condition which
equates the marginal product of labor (MPL) to the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure (MRS) . W eu s eU . S .d a t at om e a s u r et h eMPL and the MRS,
and obtain the labor wedge as the residual that makes the model condition hold in the data.
Many macroeconomic studies (including, but not limited to, the ones cited above) use a
Cobb-Douglas production function. Then, the MPL c a nb ew r i t t e na s(1 − θ)yt/lt, where
yt denotes output per person, lt denotes aggregate hours worked per person and 1−θ is the
labor income share. Time separable log preferences in consumption and leisure–frequently
used in macroeconomic studies–give a MRSequal to α(ct + φgt)/(1 − lt), where ct denotes
private consumption per person, gt denotes public consumption per person, α is the leisure
utility parameter and φ measures the marginal rate of substitution between government and
private consumption. With these functional forms, the labor wedge, ∆t, is computed as
follows:











where ct,g t,y t,l t are taken from U.S. data, θ equals 0.33, α is close to 1.6 (as in Prescott
(2004)) and φ equals 1 (as in Prescott (2004) and Ohanian, Raﬀo, and Rogerson (2008)).9
As seen in Figure 1, the U.S. measured labor wedge is fairly constant for the period 1961 to
1980, and shows a trend decline between the early 1980sa n d2007. This substantial decline
in the labor wedge is also documented in Mulligan (2002) and Shimer (2010), under diﬀerent
functional forms for the marginal value of time (MRS).
2.2 Heterogeneity and the Labor Wedge
We illustrate that heterogeneity is important in understanding the trend decline in the labor
wedge. We present a simple static model with households of diﬀerent productivities to build
9The values of the parameters θ, α and φ are discussed in more detail in our quantitative results section.
8intuition. We show that the labor wedge is partly due to cross-sectional diﬀerences in the
productivities of households. An immediate result is that changes in the labor wedge are not
entirely driven by labor market distortions, such as taxes, but also reﬂect changes in non-
distortionary factors, such as the labor supplies and relative productivities of various sub-
groups of the population. In other words, the labor wedge measured from a representative
household model reﬂects imperfect aggregation.
The simple economy consists of diﬀerent types of households indexed by j. Each household
has one member who is endowed with one unit of time and has a ﬁxed amount of capital
given by kj. Households supply labor in the market, but diﬀer in their productivity, which
is denoted by zj. The maximization problem solved by household j is:
max
cj,lj
log(cj + φg)+αlog(1 − lj)
subject to: cj ≤ rkj +( 1− τl)wzjlj + ψj
The utility is deﬁned over private consumption, cj, government consumption per person,
g, and leisure time, 1 − lj,w h e r elj is the fraction of available time devoted to work. Pa-
rameters α and φ are deﬁned as before, in Section 2.1. Households receive wage rate w per
unit of eﬀective labor, zjlj, and capital income rkj for renting the capital stock to the ﬁrm.
L a b o ri n c o m ei st a x e da tr a t eτl, and ψj are lump-sum transfers from the government.
The representative ﬁrm uses capital, K, and eﬀective labor, ˜ L, to produce output accord-
ing to the Cobb-Douglas production function: Y = AKθ˜ L1−θ.10 Here, A denotes the total
factor productivity, K is the capital stock given by K =
P
j kj and the eﬀective labor is
given by ˜ L =
P
j (zjljNj), where Nj represents the number of households of type j.T h e
wage rate per unit of eﬀective labor is given by w =( 1− θ)y/˜ l, where y = Y/N is the output
per person, N =
P
j Nj is the total population and ˜ l = ˜ L/N is the aggregate eﬀective labor
10We allow for capital stock in order for our derivations to be analogous to those presented in our general
model in Section 3. However, the same intuition about the labor wedge presented in this section can be
derived in an environment in which the production function uses only labor input.
9per person.
We show that in this simple model there exists a wedge between the aggregate marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure (MRS)a n dt h em a r g i n a lp r o d u c to fa n
hour worked (MPL). We start with the optimality condition which governs the consumption
and time allocation decisions for each household j : α(cj + φg)/(1 − lj)=( 1− τl)wzj. This
condition equates the marginal rate of substitution of household j to its after-tax marginal





















j cjNj/N is aggregate private consumption per person, and l ≡
P
j (ljNj)/N
is aggregate hours worked per person, and where we have used the expression for the wage
w. Using equation (2), the labor wedge, ∆, is given by:
























As seen in equation (3), the labor wedge is partly due to distortionary taxes, but also
reﬂects non-distortionary factors such as the diﬀerent productivities and labor decisions of
each household in the economy. We provide a numerical illustration to show that hetero-
geneity of the working population matters for the labor wedge. In this example, the economy
has two types of households of equal proportion in the population and there are no tax dis-
tortions (i.e. τl =0 ). The labor supply, lj, and productivity, zj, of each type of household
a r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e1 .I nt h eﬁrst scenario, there are large diﬀerences in hours worked and
productivity between the households. Type 2 households work only a quarter of the time per
week and are 30 percent less productive compared to type 1 households. In this case, there
is a wedge between the aggregate MRS and the MPLw h i c hi sc o m p u t e df r o me q u a t i o n(3)
11We multiply the individual optimality conditions by the fraction of agents of type j in the total popula-
tion, Nj/N, and sum up to get: α
P
j (cj + φg)Nj/N =( 1− τl)
P
j zj (1 − lj)(Nj/N)w. Next, we substitute
in the expression for the wage and divide both sides by (1 − l).
10and equals 0.13. For smaller diﬀe r e n c e si nb o t hh o u r sa n dp r o d u c t i v i t y ,a ss h o w ni nc a s e2 ,
the labor wedge remains positive, but shrinks to about 0.02. Finally, if all households work
t h es a m eh o u r s( a si nc a s e3 ) ,o rh a v et h es a m ep r o d u c t i v i t y( a si nc a s e4 ) ,a n db e c a u s e
τl =0in our example, the labor wedge disappears. This result holds more generally. When
lj = l for all j or when zj = z for all j, the labor wedge in equation (3) reduces to 1 − τl.12
Next, we present our general model with households that diﬀer by marital status, gen-
der, and productivity and show that changes in non-distortionary factors are important for
understanding the decline in the labor wedge.
3 General Model
In order to examine changes over time in U.S. hours and the labor wedge, we consider a
neoclassical growth model with three types of households: married couples, single females,
and single males. The labor supply decisions of individuals are inﬂuenced by several factors,
of which the most important are gender wage gaps and eﬀective labor income taxes.
Let Nt be the total population at time t.L e tNpt,N fst, and Nmst denote the total number
of married couples, single females and single males, respectively. Similar to Jones, Manuelli,
and McGrattan (2003), we assume that individuals in a married couple solve for decisions
eﬃciently. They choose streams of consumption, labor supply and investment to solve their





t [λfUf (cfpt+ φgt,1 − lfpt)+λmUm (cmpt + φgt,1 − lmpt)]Npt
subject to :
cfpt+ cmpt + xpt ≤ [(1 − τkt)rt + δτkt]kpt +( 1− τlt)wt [lmpt +( 1− Γpt)lfpt]+ψpt
Npt+1
Npt
kpt+1 ≤ xpt +( 1− δ)kpt
12If lj = l for all j,t h e n˜ l = l·
P







˜ l =( 1− τl).
Similarly, if zj = z for all j, then ˜ l = zl and 1 − ∆ =1− τl.
11where subscripts f and m denote female and male, subscript p indicates a married couple
or partnership,a n dt is the time subscript. The utility of a married individual of gender j ∈
{f,m} is deﬁned over streams of private consumption, cjpt, average government consumption,
gt, and leisure time, 1 − ljpt, where available time is normalized to 1 and ljpt is the labor
supply expressed as the fraction of available time worked. The discount factor is β ∈ (0,1).
The parameter φ ∈ (0,1) measures the marginal rate of substitution between private and
government consumption. The married couple owns capital stock, kpt, which depreciates
at rate δ and is augmented by investments, xpt. The capital stock is rented to the ﬁrm at
interest rate rt, and the capital income net of depreciation is taxed at rate τkt. The married
couple also pays taxes on labor income at rate τlt, and receives lump-sum transfers given by
ψpt.
In our model, married males receive an hourly wage rate of wt, while married females
receive only wt (1 − Γpt) p e rh o u rw o r k e d .H e r e ,Γpt ∈ (0,1) represents the gender wage gap
for married couples, which is exogenous to the model. Motivated by existing evidence, we
assume that women receive a lower wage for two reasons: productivity diﬀerences relative to
men and discrimination. Goldin (1992) discusses in detail that some of the U.S. gender gap
in earnings for various occupations can be explained by diﬀerences in observable attributes
between men and women, such as job experience, education. However a substantial part of
the earnings gap remains unexplained and is attributed to discrimination.13 In our model,
we assume that productivity diﬀerences account for a fraction μ ∈ [0,1] of the gender wage
gap, while discrimination accounts for the remainder. In particular, the hourly wage rate
received by a married women can be written as:
wt (1 − Γpt)=wt (1 − μΓpt) − wt (1 − μ)Γpt (4)
where wt (1 − μΓpt) is the wage rate women should receive given their marginal product
13For example, Goldin (1992) documents that wage discrimination was about 20 percent of the diﬀerence
in male and female earnings in manufacturing jobs in early 1900, and about 55 percent for oﬃce work in
1940.
12of labor (i.e. taking into account productivity diﬀerences relative to men), while the term
wt (1 − μ)Γpt represents the portion of the wage rate lost due to discrimination. Measures of
wage discrimination from U.S. data–such as those discussed in Goldin–vary over time. For
simplicity, we consider that the fraction of the gender gap accounted for by discrimination
is constant over time in the model and is given by 1 − μ.I n S e c t i o n 4, we evaluate the
importance of this assumption for female hours and the U.S. labor wedge by presenting
results under two extreme scenarios: the gender wage gap is due entirely to discrimination
or due entirely to productivity diﬀerences.
For μ ∈ (0,1), our model is consistent with the view that reductions in the gender gap
observed in the U.S. since the early 1960s, were a consequence of productivity improvements
of women and reductions in discrimination. As seen in equation (4), when the gender wage
gap, Γpt, shrinks over time, the marginal product of a married women’s labor, wt (1 − μΓpt),
increases, while the wages lost due to discrimination, wt (1 − μ)Γpt, decline.





tUj (cjst + φgt,1 − ljst)Njst
subject to :
cjst + xjst ≤ [(1 − τkt)rt + δτkt]kjst +( 1− τlt)wt (1 − IjΓst)ljst + ψjst
Njst+1
Njst
kjst+1 ≤ xjst +( 1− δ)kjst
where, as before, subscripts j ∈ {f,m} and t denote gender and time, and subscript s
indicates a single individual. We use similar notational conventions as in the married couple’s
problem. The indicator function Ij equals 1 if j = f and zero otherwise and is used to show
that single males receive hourly wage rate wt, while single females receive (1 − Γst)wt. Here,
Γst ∈ (0,1) represents the gender wage gap for singles. As before, the parameter μ governs
the share of the gender wage gap accounted for by productivity diﬀerences.
Our model diﬀerentiates between males and females along two main dimensions. First,
13married and single females receive a lower wage than males. In the quantitative experiments,
we allow the gender wage gap for singles and for married couples to diﬀer, as in the data. As
we show in later sections of the paper, reductions in the gender wage gap are important in
accounting for the increase in female hours worked over time. The second diﬀerence between
males and females in our model exists only for married couples and consists of the diﬀerent
utility weights λf and λm ≡ 1 − λf. In the quantitative experiments, the parameter λf
determines the relative level of hours worked for married men and women in the ﬁrst period
of our model (for details see Section 4).
There is a representative ﬁrm with a constant returns to scale production function that
















There is labor augmenting technical progress at a constant yearly rate of γ − 1, that is,
ζt = ζ0γt. The aggregate resource constraints for capital and eﬀective labor are given by:
Kt = kptNpt + kfstNfst+ kmstNmst
˜ Lt = lmptNpt +( 1− μΓpt)lfptNpt +( 1− μΓst)lfstNfst+ lmstNmst
T h ew a g eb i l li n(5) is given by wt˜ Lt. Here, wt is the wage rate per unit of eﬀective
labor and also the wage rate per hour worked by men. In the expression for ˜ Lt, the terms
(1 − μΓit) for i ∈ {p,s} measure the productivity of a married or single woman relative to
men. Recall that women do not get paid their marginal product of wt (1 − μΓit), but receive
the lower hourly wage rate of wt (1 − Γit) due to discrimination (as seen in equation (4) for
married women). The diﬀerence between their marginal product and the wage rate received
is equal to wt (1 − μ)Γit, and is collected by the government as revenue from discrimination.




= Ct + Xt + Gt, where
aggregate consumption is Ct ≡ Npt (cmpt + cfpt)+Nmstcmst +Nfstcfst, aggregate investment
is Xt ≡ Nptxpt + Nmstxmst + Nfstxfst and Gt ≡ Ntgt denotes government spending. In the
quantitative analysis, the government consumption is exogenous and is allowed to vary over
time.
The government collects revenue from capital and labor income taxation. The revenue is
used for government consumption expenditures and the remainder is lump-sum rebated to















1 for t =0
Qt
ς=1 (1 − δ + Rς) for t ≥ 0
(6)
and where, Rt ≡ (1 − τkt)rt + δτkt, aggregate transfers are Ψt ≡ Nptψpt + Nfstψfst +
Nmstψmst, and aggregate labor revenues, Υt, are deﬁned as:
Υt ≡ [τltwtNptlmpt + τltwtNmstlmst + τlt (1 − Γpt)wtNptlfpt+ τlt(1 − Γst)wtNfstlfst](7)
+[wt (1 − μ)ΓptNptlfpt+ wt (1 − μ)ΓstNfstlfst]
B o t hm e na n dw o m e np a yt a x e so nt h e i rl a b o ri n c o m ea tr a t eτlt. The revenues collected
from this tax are given by the ﬁrst four terms in equation (7). In addition, women’s labor
income is subject to discrimination which raises revenues equal to wt (1 − μ)ΓptNptlfpt +
wt (1 − μ)ΓstNfstlfst.
In our quantitative experiments, we allow the eﬀective labor income taxes, τlt, the gender
wage gaps, Γst and Γpt, the government consumption, gt, and the population fractions, npt ≡
Npt/Nt,n fst ≡ Nfst/Nt,n mst ≡ Nmst/Nt, to vary exogenously over time. We allow the
population fractions to vary since there has been a large increase in the fraction of singles
15and a corresponding decline in the fraction of married couples since 1961. All time-varying
inputs are measured from U.S. data, as discussed in Section 4.
3.1 Hours and the Labor Wedge in the Model
Our model augments the representative household growth model presented in Prescott (2004)
and Ohanian, Raﬀo, and Rogerson (2008) by considering labor supply decisions of men and
women. In this section, we discuss why this extension brings the model’s predictions closer
to data. We also discuss brieﬂy the counterfactual predictions of a representative household
model for U.S. hours and the labor wedge. The quantitative results are presented in Section
4.
3.1.1 Hours Worked
We brieﬂy discuss a few determinants of hours worked in our model. More details are provided
in the results section.
Households in our model own the capital and rent it to the ﬁrm. Equivalently, we could
allow the ﬁrm to buy the initial capital from the household and make capital investments
thereafter. In other words, the consumption and labor supply decisions of households do
not depend on who makes the capital investment. However, these decisions are aﬀected by
the household’s initial wealth and the lump-sum transfers it receives over the lifetime. To
illustrate this, we aggregate the sequential budget constraints of singles of gender j ∈ {f,m}



















ψjst + Njs0 (1 − δ +( 1− τk0)r0 + δτk0)kjs0
where πt is deﬁned as in (6) and Ij =1if j = f and zero otherwise.
A similar lifetime budget constraint can be derived for the married couple as well. We
16see from equation (8) that aggregate lifetime transfers and the initial wealth due to the
ownership of the capital stock inﬂuence the lifetime income of households, and thus, have an
eﬀect on the level of hours worked. Large lifetime transfers result in lower equilibrium hours
for the household.
Ak e yd i ﬀerence between the individuals in our model is the hourly wage rate they
receive. If the gender wage gaps are zero (i.e. everyone receives the same wage and is
equally productive), the men and women in our model make the same choices provided
that (i) initial wealth and lifetime transfers are proportional to the lifetime labor income
of each household and (ii) the individuals in the married couple have equal utility weights:
λm = λf. Under these conditions, the model reduces to a representative household model
with labor income taxes as in Prescott (2004) and Ohanian, Raﬀo, and Rogerson (2008).
Then, the model predicts that everyone’s hours are the same lfpt = lfst = lmst = lmpt for
all t. Moreover, an increase in the eﬀective labor income tax leads to a decline in everyone’s
hours and, thus, in aggregate hours. This is consistent with the results of the two previous
studies mentioned, but inconsistent with U.S. data which shows an increase in hours worked
despite tax increases.
The model delivers more interesting predictions for hours worked when gender wage gaps
are positive. All else equal, women in the model work fewer hours than men, and their hours
grow over time as the gender wage gaps shrink. Both of these predictions are consistent with
U.S. data. In Section 4, we evaluate the quantitative importance of taxes, gender wage gaps
and other model features in accounting for the changes in U.S. hours worked.
3.1.2 Aggregation and the Labor Wedge
We derive the labor wedge in our model and show that it depends on taxes, as suggested by
previous studies, but also on labor market variables such as gender wage gaps, female labor
supply and the aggregate labor supply. The derivation is similar to that in Section 2.
To obtain an expression for the labor wedge we aggregate the model’s labor equilibrium
17conditions which are summarized in equation (9) for married and single men and in equation
(10) for married and single women.
α(cmit + φgt)
1 − lmit
=( 1 − τlt)wt, for i ∈ {p,s} (9)
α(cfit+ φgt)
1 − lfit
=( 1 − τlt)(1− Γit)wt, for i ∈ {p,s} (10)
We multiply each of the intratemporal conditions by the fraction of households of that
type (i.e. fraction of married couples, npt, and fraction of singles, nfst and nmst)a n ds u mu p












Here, ct = Ct/Nt denotes aggregate private consumption per person, gt = Gt/Nt denotes
public consumption per person,l t = nptlmpt + nptlfpt+ nmstlmst + nfstlfst denotes aggregate





/Nt denotes output per person.
Combining equation (11) with the deﬁnition of the labor wedge given in equation (1),
we can rewrite 1 − ∆t as in (12).
1 − ∆t =( 1− τlt)
∙
1 −






The labor wedge, ∆t, depends on endogenous labor supply decisions of the households,
as well as time-varying exogenous inputs of the model such as taxes, gender wage gaps and
fractions of females in the total population. Notice that μ–the parameter the governs the
share of the gender wage gap accounted for by productivity diﬀerences–enters equation (12)
indirectly through ˜ lt. When μ =1 , the gender gap is due entirely to productivity diﬀerences
between men and women. Then, changes in the labor wedge reﬂect changes in distortionary
14For a full derivation, see Appendix A.2.
18taxes, as well as changes in non-distortionary factors, such as the productivity of women, as
discussed in the static example in Section 2.W h e nμ =0 , the gender gap is due entirely to
discrimination which can be interpreted as another distortion that aﬀects the changes in the
labor wedge.
In what follows, we brieﬂy discuss the model’s predictions for the labor wedge under
v a r i o u ss c e n a r i o s .Am o r ed e t a i l e da n a l y s i si sp r o v i d e di nt h eq u a n t i t a t i v ee x p e r i m e n t ss e c -
tion. First, consider the case when men and women earn the same wage (i.e. Γpt = Γst =0 ) .
Equation (12) simpliﬁes to: 1 − ∆t =1− τlt, which means that the model’s labor wedge
is exogenously determined. As discussed in Section 3.1.1, the model reduces to a standard
growth model with taxes, as in Prescott (2004) and Ohanian, Raﬀo, and Rogerson (2008).
Since taxes, τlt, increased in U.S. data in the last 50 years, the labor wedge, ∆t, generated
under this scenario increases, contrary to what was observed in U.S. data.
Now consider the more interesting case in which the gender wage gaps are positive (i.e.
Γpt > 0, Γst > 0). For simplicity, assume that our model has only married couples and no
single households, and that the gender wage gap is due entirely to discrimination. Equa-
tion (12) simpliﬁes to: 1 − ∆t =( 1− τlt)[1− 0.5 · Γpt (1 − lfpt)/(1 − lt)]. Can the model
deliver a labor wedge that declines over time as seen in U.S. data? Recall that since the
early 1960s, the U.S. gender wage gap shrunk and taxes increased. If the model gener-
ates an increase in aggregate hours, lt, and a larger increase in female hours, lfpt, the term
[1 − 0.5 · Γpt (1 − lfpt)/(1 − lt)] increases over time. In our quantitative analysis, we show
that this increase dominates the decline in (1 − τlt), and the model delivers a decline in the
labor wedge, ∆t, over time (see Section 4.2 for details).
194 Quantitative Analysis
We compute the equilibrium paths of our model and compare its predictions with U.S. data.
In our baseline experiment, we treat the eﬀective labor income taxes, the gender wage gaps,
the government consumption and population fractions as exogenous, time-varying inputs.
We perform other experiments to isolate the quantitative importance of each factor.
4.1 Baseline Calibration
Here, we present and motivate the model parameters and the exogenous series used as inputs
in the quantitative experiments. We choose parameters so that our baseline model matches
key statistics of the U.S. economy. We use national accounts and ﬁxed assets data, revenue
statistics and survey data for the U.S. as described in detail in Appendix A.1. Unless
otherwise noted, we use data for the years 1961 to 2007. The parameters and time-varying
inputs are summarized in Table 2 and Figure 2.
First, we discuss the measurement of the time-varying exogenous inputs of our model.
The eﬀective labor income taxes are deﬁned as in Prescott (2004) and Shimer (2009). In
particular, τlt =1− (1 − τht)/(1 + τct), where τht and τct are the labor income tax rate
and the consumption tax rate which are constructed following the methodology of Mendoza,
Razin, and Tesar (1994). The interpretation of this eﬀective tax is that one additional
unit of pre-tax labor income buys (1 − τht)/(1 + τct) units of consumption, after labor and
consumption taxes are paid for. The government-consumption to output ratio is constructed
using national accounts data. The gender wage gaps for married and single individuals, Γpt
and Γst, are measured using microdata from the Current Population Survey (CPS) as detailed
in the data appendix. Finally, the population fractions, npt,n fst,n mst, are also measured from
the CPS.
We choose η t om a t c ht h ea v e r a g ep o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hr a t ea n dγ to match the average
growth rate of labor augmenting technical change over the 47 year period. We choose θ and
20δ to match the average capital income share and the average depreciation rate, respectively.
We set τk to the average capital income tax for the U.S. since 1970. The discount factor is
chosen to match a steady state after-tax net return (1 − τk)r∗ + δτk − δ of 4 percent.
We use the following utility function: Uf = Um = U = 1
1−σ
n





We follow Prescott (2004) and Ohanian, Raﬀo, and Rogerson (2008) and set the intertempo-
ral substitution parameter, σ, and the government consumption parameter, φ, to 1.T h e
leisure parameter, α, and the utility weights in the married couple’s problem, λf and
λm ≡ 1 − λf, are calibrated as follows. First, note that α aﬀects the level of hours of
all individuals in the economy, as well as the level of aggregate hours. The utility weights
λf and λm inﬂuence the relative level of hours for married males and females. We pick α
and λf so that the aggregate labor supply and married female labor supply in the initial
period in the model are consistent with U.S. data on hours worked in 1961. Recall that labor
supply in the model is expressed as a fraction of available time worked. Given 100 hours
of available time per week, the aggregate weekly hours worked in the model are lt · 100 and
married female weekly hours worked are lfpt · 100. Our calibration ensures that l1961 · 100
equals 24.6 hours and lfp1961 ·100 equals 10.3 hours, as observed in U.S. data in 1961.O n c e
α and λf are calibrated, the levels of hours for the other individuals for the year 1961 are
determined in equilibrium.
As discussed in Section 3.1.1, the initial capital stock wealth and lifetime transfers have
an impact on the level of hours of each household. We set initial wealth of each household,
kp0,k fs0 and kms0, to be proportional to labor income in 1961. We set lifetime transfers to
be proportional to the total income (labor income plus initial capital stock wealth) earned
by each household in the model. This choice of distributing transfers preserves the ratios of
lifetime income between the three groups of households.
I no u rb a s e l i n ec a l i b r a t i o n ,w ea s s u m et h a tt h eg e n d e rg a pi se n t i r e l yd u et od i s c r i m i n a t i o n
(i.e. μ =0 ). We later perform a sensitivity analysis to this choice by considering how our
results change when the gender gap is accounted for entirely by productivity diﬀerences
21between males and females (i.e. μ =1 ).
4.2 Results
W ee v a l u a t et h ee x t e n tt ow h i c ht h em o d e li sa b l et or e p l i c a t et r e n d si na v e r a g eh o u r sw o r k e d
for the diﬀerent population groups relative to the U.S. data. We measure the labor wedge
generated in the model–as the aggregate discrepancy between the marginal rate of substi-
tution between consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labor–and examine
whether it is consistent with U.S. data. We report results from multiple experiments in or-
der to isolate the relative importance of the diﬀerent factors considered: taxes, gender wage
gaps, government consumption ratio and population fractions. In Section 5,w ed i s c u s so t h e r
factors that may be important for labor supply, such as child care costs, home production
and leisure time.
Our baseline model allows all exogenous inputs–taxes, gender wage gaps, government
consumption ratio and population fractions–to vary over time as seen in U.S. data (see
Figure 2). The results for hours worked and the labor wedge are reported in Figure 3.T h e
solid lines in the left side panels of the ﬁgure show weekly hours worked by males and females
in the U.S. economy between 1961 and 2007. The dashed lines show the baseline model results
for hours worked (e.g. for married males, we plot lmpt ·100 where lmpt is the fraction of time
worked and 100 represents the available hours per week). The model is quite successful in
matching the level of hours and in accounting for the changes in hours over time. Recall that
aggregate hours and married females hours for the year 1961 are matched through the choice
of α and λf. The levels of hours worked for married males, single males and single females
for the year 1961 are not pinned down in the calibration, but are determined in equilibrium.
While the model does not match these levels exactly, it does deliver the same ranking of
hours among the diﬀerent population groups as in the data for the year 1961. For example,
in the data, a single male worked about 26% more than a single female in year 1961, while
the comparable ﬁgure in the model was 25%.
22The upper right panel of Figure 3 plots aggregate weekly hours worked in the data and
in the baseline model (variable lt). The model predicts correctly very little changes in hours
between 1960 and 1980, and an increase in hours afterwards. In the data, the overall increase
in hours since 1960 was 13.3 percent, while the model delivers an increase of 8.4%. An obvious
discrepancy between the model and the data is seen during the 1990s. In the data, aggregate
hours worked increase, while the model predicts a decline during this period due to the
increase in observed taxes.15 Lastly, as seen in the lower right panel of Figure 3, the model
delivers a decline in the labor wedge since the early 1980s.
More detailed results from the baseline model are shown in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3
presents a detailed comparison of hours in the data and the model. Using the expression for
















The contribution of each group of the population–married males, married females, single
females and married females–can be decomposed further into the change in the fraction of
the population in the group, the group’s share in aggregate hours in 1961 and the change in


















The baseline model matches the decomposition of aggregate hours well, as seen in Table
3. The fractions of married couples and singles in the total population are exogenous inputs
into the baseline model, which means that changes in these fractions are matched exactly.
Regarding the distribution of hours in U.S. data, in 1961 married men accounted for about
64 percent of hours worked, single men and women accounted for about 9.7 percent each,
15This counterfactual prediction for hours worked during the 1990si sa l s op r e s e n ti nas t a n d a r dg r o w t h
model with a representative household. McGrattan and Prescott (2010) show that the U.S. hours boom
observed in the 1990s is no longer puzzling after accounting for intangible investment.
23and married women for about 17 percent. In the model, the share of hours of each group
in the aggregate hours is tightly linked to their predicted level of hours in the initial period.
For example, singles contribute slightly more to aggregate hours in 1961 compared to the
data, because the model predicts slightly higher hours for them in 1961 (see Figure 3).B y
the same token, the share of hours of married females in aggregate hours are matched almost
exactly. Regarding changes in hours, the model predicts that hours worked by males fall by
more than in the data, but hours worked by females increase similarly to what was observed.
Table 4 presents details on the model’s labor factor, 1 − ∆t. Although for most of the
paper we discuss changes in the labor wedge, ∆t, Table 4 focuses on the labor factor because
its changes over time can be decomposed into several multiplicative components. First, using
equation (1) and φ =1 , we can decompose changes in the labor factor into two components:
the consumption to output ratio, (ct + gt)/yt and an aggregate labor component (or an
aggregate labor to leisure ratio), lt/(1 − lt). Notice that changes over time in the labor factor
do not depend on the leisure parameter, α, or on the capital income share, θ. Our baseline
model predicts an increase of 6.6 percent in the labor factor (which is equivalent to a decline
of about 10.5 percent in the labor wedge). All of the increase in the model’s labor factor
is driven by an increase in the aggregate labor component, while the model’s consumption
to output ratio declines. When measured using U.S. data, the labor factor increases by
more between 1961 and 2007, partly due to an increase in the consumption to output ratio,
and partly due to a larger increase in the aggregate labor component. This decomposition
underscores one of the counterfactual predictions of the model: the consumption to output
ratio declines in the model while it increased in U.S. data. Later in this section, we show
that this result holds in multiple experiments and that the model is unable to deliver both an
increase in aggregate hours and an increase in the consumption to output ratio, as observed
in U.S. data.
A second decomposition of the labor factor from our baseline model makes use of equation
(12) and is also presented in Table 4. Changes in the labor factor are now determined by
24changes in a tax rate component, 1 − τlt, and changes in a female labor component given
by 1−
nptΓpt(1−lfpt)+nfstΓst(1−lfst)
1−lt . Recall that the baseline model attributes all of the gender
wage gaps to discrimination (i.e. μ =0 ), which means that the labor input equals the
eﬀective labor (i.e. lt/˜ lt =1 ). The ﬁrst lesson from this decomposition is that the increase
of 6.6 percent in the labor factor in the baseline model is driven entirely by the female labor
component. The eﬀective tax rate component, 1 − τlt, is exogenous to the model and leads
to a decline in the labor factor. The female labor component depends on inputs that are
exogenous to the model, such as gender wage gaps and fractions of females in the population,
but also on endogenous labor supply decisions of women and on the average labor supply.
In the model, this component increases by about 15 percent over time, which is close to the
increase obtained when we evaluate the expression using U.S. data. The bottom line from
Table 4 is that a model with changes in gender wage gaps only, and no changes in eﬀective
taxes will predict a larger increase in the labor factor (or a larger decline in the labor wedge).
This result is illustrated further in a separate experiment.
We perform additional experiments to show that the closing of the gender wage gaps
are an important driving force for our results. Unless otherwise noted, we use the same
parameters in these experiments as given in Table 2. In Figure 4, we plot the results from
an experiment in which only gender wage gaps are allowed to vary over time, as measured
from U.S. data. All other exogenous inputs shown in Figure 2 are held ﬁxed at their 1961
levels. Overall, the predictions from this experiment for hours of males and females, as well
as aggregate hours are closer to U.S. data. The main reason for the improved predictions
is that eﬀective income tax rates do not vary over time. As a result, the model predicts a
smaller decline in male hours and a slightly larger increase in females hours compared to
the baseline model. Moreover, the labor wedge declines by nearly twice as much as in the
baseline experiment. The main diﬀerence is again due to taxes.
Figure 5 reports results from an experiment in which the gender wage gaps are held ﬁxed
at their 1961 levels. All other exogenous inputs–taxes, government consumption ratio and
25fractions of households–shown in Figure 2 are allowed to vary over time. Without shrinking
gender wage gaps, the model fails to generate increases in women’s hours worked. In fact,
hours worked for all groups decline marginally over time due to increases in eﬀective labor
income taxes. As a result, the model fails to capture the observed increase in aggregate
hours worked. Moreover, the increase in the labor wedge is inconsistent with U.S. data. The
predictions of this experiment are similar to the predictions of a standard growth model with
a representative household and time-varying taxes.
Some additional experiments are summarized in Table 5 and compared with the experi-
ments we already discussed. We present predictions for aggregate hours, lt, married women’s
hours, lfpt, the labor wedge, ∆t, and the consumption to output ratio, (ct + gt)/yt.F i r s t ,
note that neither of the experiments can account for the increase in the consumption to
output ratio observed in the data. This result aﬀects negatively the predictions for the labor
wedge as discussed earlier (see Table 4). Our baseline model accounts for about 63 percent
o ft h ei n c r e a s ei na g g r e g a t eh o u r sw o r k e dp e rw e e k ,83 percent of the increase in married
women’s hours, while it accounts for only 30 percent of the decline in the labor wedge.
Among the experiments with only one time-varying input, the experiment with changes in
gender wage gaps performs the best. It accounts for 95 percent of the increase in aggre-
gate hours and about 54 percent of the decline in the labor wedge. The experiment with
changes in eﬀective taxes alone has counterfactual predictions for labor supply and for the
labor wedge. The experiment in which we allow only the fractions of married couples and
singles to vary over time delivers an increase in labor supply, but for the wrong reasons.
In this experiment, the hours of all individuals increase slightly over time. The increase in
the model’s aggregate hours is then driven mainly by singles, since the fractions of singles
increases signiﬁcantly between 1961 and 2007, as observed in U.S. data.
In all experiments discussed so far, we have assumed that males and females are equally
productive, and the gender wage gaps are due entirely to discrimination (i.e. μ =0 ). We
perform an experiment in which all exogenous inputs are allowed to vary over time, but we
26assume the gender wage gaps are due entirely to productivity diﬀerences between females
and males (i.e. μ =1 ). We recalibrate parameters α and λf to match the same targets
on hours worked as in the baseline calibration, but keep all other parameters unchanged.
We ﬁnd that a model with μ =1implies fairly similar changes in hours worked for males
and females. Aggregate hours go up by 7.4 percent compared to 8.4 percent in the baseline
model. The decline in the labor wedge is smaller in this experiment compared to the baseline.
Recall that using equation (12) the labor factor, 1−∆t, can be decomposed in three factors
as shown at the bottom of Table 4.W h e nμ =1 , the ratio lt/˜ lt is less than one, leading to
smaller increases (decreases) in the labor factor (labor wedge).16 We thus conclude that the
particular choice of μ–the fraction of the gender wage gaps accounted for by productivity
diﬀerences–does not overturn our conclusion that the gender wage gap is an important
driving force behind the long-run changes in U.S. labor supply over the period 1961 to 2007.
5 Other Considerations
We have shown that reductions in the gender wage gap for married couples and singles are
important in accounting for the increase in female hours worked observed in the U.S. Our
model successfully delivers an increase in U.S. hours worked and a decline in the U.S. labor
wedge, despite the observed increase in eﬀective labor income taxes. In this section, we
consider other factors that may have an impact on hours worked, and the U.S. labor wedge.
5.1 Changes in Child Care Costs
Attanasio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos (2008) show that reductions in child care costs along
with reductions in the gender wage gap over time help explain the increase in participation
16Our results are approximately linear in the value of μ. The results from our baseline experiment (which
has μ =0 ) and from the experiment with μ =1provide upper and lower bounds on how successful the
model is. For example, an experiment in which all exogenous inputs are allowed to vary over time, but the
value of μ equals 0.5, predicts that aggregate hours increase by 7.9 percent and the labor wedge declines by
9.4 percent. These values are about midway between the results from the baseline model and the experiment
with μ =1(see Table 5).
27rates of females in the U.S. The idea is that in the past child care costs were very high
a n dm o t h e r ss t a y e da th o m ea f t e rb i r t ht oc a r ef or their children. Thus, the rise in married
women’s labor supply is really a story about their wages increasing, as well as the number
of children and the child care costs decreasing.
We consider an extension of our baseline model that features reductions in child care
costs. We model child care services as a cost paid by the married couple. The married
female decides how many hours, lfpt, to work given the wage rate, (1 − Γpt)wt, she receives
and given the hourly cost of childcare services, χt. The new sequential budget constraints of
the married couple are:
cfpt+ cmpt + xpt ≤ [(1 − τkt)rt + δτkt]kpt +( 1− τlt)wtlmpt
+[(1− τlt)wt (1 − Γpt) − χt]lfpt+ ψpt
The new resource constraint is:




where Ξt are the total resources spent on child care: Ξt = nptlfptχt.
The intratemporal condition for the married female changes to (13) while the other three
intratemporal conditions remain unchanged.
α(cfpt+ φgt)
1 − lfpt
=( 1− τlt)(1− Γpt)wt − χt (13)
We perform an experiment that features all time-varying inputs from our baseline model,
plus changes in child care costs. We recalibrate parameters α and λf, so that the model
with child care costs matches the same targets for hours worked as discussed in the base-
line calibration.17 We keep all other parameters unchanged. To set the level of χt, we use
17Note that under the baseline calibration, a model with child care costs predicts that married women
would work fewer hours relative to the model with no child care costs. This leads us to recalibrate parameters
28data provided by U.S. Census Bureau based on the Survey of Income and Program Par-
ticipation. According to this survey, the average child care expenditures of families with
employed mothers that pay for such services were 15% of the mother’s income in the year
2004.18 We pick χ2004 so the ratio of child care costs to the married woman’s income,
χ2004/(w2004 (1 − Γp,2004)), equals 0.15. A more problematic issue is the measurement of the
change in child care costs from early 1960s to present. Attanasio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos
(2008) consider reductions in child care costs that range between −5% to −20%.I n o u r
e x p e r i m e n t ,w eu s e dt h em i d p o i n to ft h i sr a n g e .W ep i c kχ1961 such that the childcare costs,
as a fraction of a married female’s income, decline linearly by 12.5% between 1961 and 2004.
The results of this experiment are plotted in Figure 6, against the baseline model (with
no child care costs). As expected, reductions in child care costs contribute to the increase in
hours worked by married females. In our baseline model, hours of married females increase
by a factor of 2.08 between 1961 and 2007. Adding reductions in child care costs leads to an
increase in married female hours by a factor of 2.2. The hours of all other individuals are
comparable across the two experiments. As a result, aggregate hours increase by a bit more
and the labor wedge declines by a bit more over the 47 year period (see Table 5).
We conclude that reductions in child care costs help contribute to the increase in the
labor supply and the decline in the labor wedge observed in the U.S. since 1960s. However,
their quantitative role is less prominent than that of the gender wage gap.
5.2 Changes in Time Devoted to Home Production and Leisure
Ohanian, Raﬀo, and Rogerson (2008) suggest that the counterfactual predictions of the neo-
classical growth model for U.S. hours can potentially be reconciled by taking into account
changes in the amount of time devoted to home production. In their representative agent
model (as well as in the model presented in this paper), hours worked in the market and
α and λf.
18These data are available at: http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/childcare.html, under
"Who’s Minding the Kids? Child Care Arrangements: Summer 2006", Table 6. The child care expenditures
provided by the survey are for families with children age 15 and younger.
29leisure time are mirror images of each other. In U.S. data, leisure time depends not only on
time spent at work, but also on time spent in non-market activities such as home produc-
tion.19 Therefore, a model that accounts for the decline in home production observed in the
U.S. in the past 50 years has a better chance of matching the increase in U.S. hours worked.
In this section, we argue that taking into account changes in home production and leisure
time helps improve the predictions of our models for U.S. hours and the labor wedge. How-
ever, from a quantitative point of view, this mechanism can only provide part of the story.
To see this, consider the case in which our baseline model reduces to a standard growth
model (i.e. all individuals are the same). The labor equilibrium condition, which relates the








Now, consider an extension of the model where leisuret ≡ 1−lt− (non-market hours)t . We
ask: what is the change needed in leisure time in order for equation (14) to be consistent with
the data? Using previously mentioned U.S. data on taxes, private and public consumption,
output and hours worked, we know that (1 − τlt) declines by 7.5%, (ct + gt)/yt increases
by 6.8% and hours worked increase by 13.3% between 1960 and 2007. Then, leisure time
w o u l dn e e dt oi n c r e a s eb y31%(= 1.068∗113.3/92.5−1) between 1960 and 2007 in order for
equation (14) to hold.
The evidence regarding change in leisure time since 1960 is a bit mixed. Ramey and
Francis (2009) document that time devoted to leisure activities changed fairly little between
1960 and 2005. F o rm a l e sb e t w e e nt h ea g e so f25 and 54, they document a decline in
average weekly hours worked, and an increase in time spent in home production between
1960 and 2005 (see Tables 2 and 4 in their paper). Over the same time period, females in the
same age group increased their weekly hours worked, while reducing the time spent in home
19There are many papers in the literature that focus on home production and time devoted to this nonmar-
ket activity, including, but not limited to, Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991), Ingram, Kocherlakota,
and Savin (1997), Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003), Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005).
30production. Overall, leisure time measured as the diﬀerence between time available and
time devoted to non-leisure activities (such as work, school, home production, commuting
and personal care time) changed little for both males and females since 1960 (see Figure 5
in Ramey and Francis (2009)). In contrast, Aguiar and Hurst (2007) document that, over
a similar time period, leisure time has increased anywhere between four to eight hours per
week for males and females of working age (see Table III in their paper). As pointed out
by Ramey and Francis, some of the diﬀerences in estimates are due to diﬀerent deﬁnitions
of leisure. Both studies document that average time spent in home production in the U.S.
declined since the 1960s.
We conclude that a model where leisure time takes into account various forms of non-
market activity may help improve the predictions of our model for U.S. hours and the labor
wedge. However, the evidence seems mixed. The larger-end estimates provided by Aguiar
and Hurst (2007) show an increase in leisure time of about 15 percent between 1965 and
2003, while the estimates provided by Ramey and Francis (2009) show an increase of barely
2 percent.
6C o n c l u s i o n
From 1960 to 2007, average hours worked in the U.S. increased by about thirteen percent.
This increase was driven by a very large increase of married women’s hours, while single
women’s hours rose only slightly and hours of men declined. In order to examine these trends,
we augment the standard growth model to allow for gender and marital status heterogeneity.
We consider the impact of various exogenous factors on labor supply, the most important of
w h i c ha r ec h a n g e si ne ﬀective labor income taxes and changes in the gender wage gaps. Our
baseline model can account for much of the observed increase in aggregate labor supply, and
much of the changes in the diﬀerent group’s labor supply over time.
Building on the success of the model for labor supply, we assess the extent to which it is
31able to generate a trend decline in the labor wedge consistent with aggregate data for the U.S.
economy. We measure the labor wedge in the model as the aggregate discrepancy between
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption for leisure and the marginal product
of labor. While shrinking gender wage gaps allow the model to generate a labor wedge that
declines beginning in the early 1980s, we ﬁnd that a non-negligible discrepancy remains. A
lesson from our exercise is that, in order to fully understand the changes in the U.S. labor
wedge since 1980s, our models need to simultaneously predict the observed increasing trend
in the consumption to output ratio and the increase in labor supply. A key contribution of
our work is to show that the labor wedge measured from a representative household model
partly reﬂects imperfect household aggregation. We show that the labor wedge is partly
due to non-distortionary factors such as the labor supply and relative productivities of men
and women. In this paper, we have focused on long-run changes in the labor wedge and a
particular split of the population by gender and marital status. However, a natural extension
of our analysis is to examine recessions by considering how changes in various subgroups of
the employed population with diﬀerent productivities aﬀects the labor wedge.
A.1 Data Appendix
Survey data: We use data from the IPUMS-CPS to construct our measures of average
hours worked and the gender wage gap. The IPUMS-CPS is based on the March Current
Population Survey and is available yearly since 1962 at http://cps.ipums.org/cps/. We use
the following variables in our calculations:
• PERWT: person weight, 1962 − 2008
• AGE: person’s age at last birthday, 1962 − 2008
• SEX: sex, 1962 − 2008
• MARST: current marital status, 1962 − 2008
32• EMPSTAT: current employment status, 1962 − 2008
• WKSWORK1: number of weeks worked last year, 1976 − 2008
• WKSWORK2: number of weeks worked last year, 1962 − 2008.T h i sv a r i a b l ed i ﬀers
from WKSWORK1 in that responses are given in intervals: 1 − 13 weeks; 14 − 26
weeks; 27 − 39 weeks; 40 − 47 weeks; 48 − 49 weeks; and 50 − 52 weeks
• HRSWORK: hours worked last week, 1962 − 2008.
• INCWAGE: wage and salary income last year, 1962 − 2008.
For each person, we construct total hours worked last year as the product of weeks worked
and hours worked per week. Starting 1976, we use the variable WKSWORK1 to obtain weeks
worked for each person. Prior to 1976, the survey provides only the variable WKSWORK2
which gives us an interval for the weeks worked for each person. In our calculations for
years 1962 through 1975, we replace variable WKSWORK2 with an average number of
w e e k sw o r k e d( g i v e ni ne q u a t i o n15) that is calculated based on variable WKSWORK1 as
follows. We take variable WKSWORK1 and group persons according to their number of
weeks worked into the same intervals provided in variable WKSWORK2. We then compute
t h ea v e r a g ew e e k sw o r k e df o re a c ho ft h es i xi n t e r v a l sf r o m1976 to 2008.F o re a c hi n t e r v a l ,
the averages obtained vary very little over time. For example, the average number of weeks
worked for persons working between 1 and 13 weeks was roughly 8 for all years from 1976
to 2008.
weeks worked, 1962 − 1975 =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
8.0 if WKSWORK2 is 1 − 13 weeks
21.7 if WKSWORK2 is 14 − 26 weeks
33.7 if WKSWORK2 is 27 − 39 weeks
42.6 if WKSWORK2 is 40 − 47 weeks
48.3 if WKSWORK2 is 48 − 49 weeks
51.9 if WKSWORK2 is 50 − 52 weeks
(15)
33W eu s ev a r i a b l eI N C W A G Et oo b t a i nt h ew a g ep e rh o u r sf o re a c hp e r s o n .
Next, we construct population, employment, average hours worked and median wage per
hour for each of the following groups of the population: total population, married men,
married women, single men, single women. Our measure of married couples includes the
following categories from the variable MARST: "married, spouse present", "married, spouse
absent" and "separated". We group the categories "divorced", "widowed" and "never mar-
ried" under our measure of singles. We use population ages 20 to 64. We use the median
w a g ep e rh o u rb e c a u s ei ti sn o ta ﬀected by changes in the top code. To construct employ-
ment we take all persons who were employed and at work during the reference week, all
persons who were employed but not at work that week, and all persons in the Armed Forces
(EMPSTAT = 10, 12 and 13, respectively). We construct hours worked by employed persons
using all respondents that report EMPSTAT equal to 10 or 13. The average hours worked
per week are then given by: hE · E
N · 1
52, where hE are hours worked during the year by
employed people, E is the total number of employed persons, and N is the total population.
Our implicit assumption is that persons not at work during the reference week (i.e. people
with EMPSTAT equal to 12) work similar yearly hours to those at work during the reference
week.
The average hours worked we obtain for the total population are very similar to those
reported by Cociuba, Ueberfeldt, and Prescott (2009). Our average hours worked for married
and single individuals diﬀer slightly from those reported by McGrattan and Rogerson (2008),
who use population 25 − 64.
National accounts and ﬁxed assets data: We obtain these data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. We make a few adjustments to the national accounts. We treat con-
sumer durables as investment. We treat government military investment as government
consumption and the remainder of government investment is treated as investment. We also
remove sales taxes from the gross domestic product.
34Tax rates: We use data from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment to construct tax rates following the methodology of Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994).
We use Joines (1981) to extend the series of tax rates before 1970.
A.2 Model Aggregate Intratemporal Condition
Here, we derive the model’s aggregate intratemporal condition. The model has four intratem-
poral equations for each type of consumer in the economy. We multiply each intratemporal
condition by the fraction of consumers of that type and sum up. We obtain:
α(nptcmpt + nptcfpt+ nmstcmst + nfstcfst)+αφgt (2npt + nmst + nfst) (16)
=( 1 − τlt)wtnpt (1 − lmpt)+( 1− τlt)wtnpt (1 − Γpt)(1− lfpt)
+(1− τlt)wtnmst (1 − lmst)+( 1− τlt)wtnfst(1 − Γst)(1− lfst)
Equation (16) can also be written as α(ct + φgt)=( 1− τlt)wtΛt, where ct ≡ Ct
Nt denotes
aggregate private consumption per person, and where Λt is deﬁned as below.
Λt ≡ 2npt + nmst + nfst− nptlmpt + npt [−lfpt− Γpt (1 − lfpt)] − nmstlmst
+nfst[−lfst− Γst (1 − lfst)]
Λt =1 − (nptlmpt + nptlfpt+ nmstlmst + nfstlfst) − nptΓpt (1 − lfpt) − nfstΓst (1 − lfst)
In the last expression we have used 2npt + nmst + nfst =( 2 Npt + Nmst + Nfst)/Nt =1 .
Let lt denote aggregate hours worked per person: lt ≡ nptlmpt+nptlfpt+nmstlmst+nfstlfst.
The aggregate intratemporal equation becomes:
α(ct + φgt)=( 1− τlt)wt [1 − lt − nptΓpt (1 − lfpt) − nfstΓst (1 − lfst)]
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39Figure 1: Hours Worked and The Labor Wedge Measured from U.S. Data
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40Figure 2: Time-Varying Model Inputs Measured from U.S. Data
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41Figure 3: H o u r sa n dt h eL a b o rW e d g ei nD a t aa n dB a s e l i n eM o d e l




























Aggregate Weekly Hours Worked













42Figure 4: Model with Shrinking Gender Wage Gaps Only
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Model with Time−Varying Gender Wage Gaps Only
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43Figure 5: Model with Time-Varying Taxes, Government Consumption and
Fractions of Households
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Model with All Time−Varying Inputs Except Gender Wage Gaps
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44Figure 6: Model with All Time-VArying Inputs and Childcare Costs
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45Table 1: Heterogeneity and the Labor Wedge: Numerical Illustration
Households Computations†
Type 1 Type 2 l ˜ l ∆
Case 1: Large differences in lj and zj 0.25 0.235 0.128
Fraction of total population, Nj/N 1/21 /2
Hours worked per week, lj 0.40 0.10
Productivity, zj 1.00 0.70
Case 2: Small differences in lj and zj 0.35 0.328 0.018
Fraction of total population, Nj/N 1/21 /2
Hours worked per week, lj 0.40 0.30
Productivity, zj 1.00 0.85
Case 3: Differences in zj Only 0.40 0.34 0
Fraction of total population, Nj/N 1/21 /2
Hours worked per week, lj 0.40 0.40
Productivity, zj 1.00 0.70
Case 4: Differences in lj Only 0.25 0.25 0
Fraction of total population, Nj/N 1/21 /2
Hours worked per week, lj 0.40 0.10
Productivity, zj 1.00 1.00
†The aggregate hours worked per person are given by l =
P
j (ljNj)/N and the aggregate eﬀective labor
per person is given by ˜ l =
P
j (zjljNj)/N. The labor wedge, ∆, is computed using equation (3), keeping
in mind that τl is zero in our numerical illustration.
46Table 2: Baseline Model Parameters and Time Varying Inputs
Parameters Values
Population growth η =1 .013
Technology growth γ =1 .017
Capital income share θ =0 .33
Depreciation of capital δ =0 .05
Capital income tax rate τk =0 .40
Discount factor β =0 .98
Intertemporal substitution σ =1 .00
Government consumption parameter φ =1 .00
Leisure parameter α =1 .58
Weights in utility, λfUf + λmUm λf =0 .465,λ m =1− λf
Share of gender gap due to μ =0
productivity diﬀerences
Time-Varying Inputs Values (See Figure 2)
Eﬀective labor income tax rate τlt =
Consumption Tax + Labor Tax
1+Consumption Tax
Gender wage gaps Γit =1−
hourly wage for females at t
hourly wage for males at t ,i∈ {p,s}
for married (p) and singles (s)
Government consumption to output ratio Gt
Yt from NIPA data






47Table 3: Baseline Model: Changes in Weekly Hours Worked, 1961 to 2007










Data: l2007/l1961 = 1.133
Male Female
Contribution of group ν Married Single Single Married
Change in fraction of population,
nν2007
nν1961 0.743∗ 2.364∗ 1.803∗ 0.743∗
Share of aggregate hours in 1961, nν1961·lν1961
l1961 0.641 0.097 0.098 0.169
Change in hours worked, lν2007
lν1961 0.913 0.964 1.122 2.258
Baseline Model: l2007/l1961 = 1.084
Male Female
Contribution of group ν Married Single Single Married
Change in fraction of population,
nν2007
nν1961 0.743∗ 2.364∗ 1.803∗ 0.743∗
Share of aggregate hours in 1961, nν1961·lν1961
l1961 0.589 0.119 0.122 0.169
Change in hours worked,
lν2007
lν1961 0.822 0.804 1.069 2.083
†Changes in aggregate hours are decomposed into the contributions of the diﬀerent groups in the population:
married males (mp), single males (ms), single females (fs) and married females (fp). In the formula in
this table, note that Nmpt=Nfpt=Npt for all t. ∗The fractions of married couples and singles in the total
population are exogenous inputs into the baseline model, hence the model matches the changes in these
fractions by construction.
48Table 4: Baseline Model: Changes in the Labor Factor, 1961 to 2007†













Changes in Labor Factor and Components
Baseline Modela Datab
Labor Factor, 1 − ∆t 1.0661 1.2660
Consumption to output ratio,
(ct+gt)
yt 0.9570 1.0687
Aggregate labor component, lt
1−lt 1.1141 1.1847
Tax component, 1 − τlt 0.9252 0.9252
Female labor component, 1 −
nptΓpt(1−lfpt)+nfstΓst(1−lfst)
1−lt 1.1523 1.1543
Labor input to eﬀective labor ratio, lt/˜ lt 1
†The expressions for the model’s labor factor are derived in Section 3.1.2 (see Equations (1) and (12)). aThe
column "Baseline Model" reports calculations using data generated from the baseline model. This model
attributes all of the gender wage gap to discrimination, so there are no diﬀerences between the labor input,
lt,a n de ﬀective labor, ˜ lt. bThe column "Data" shows the changes in the labor factor and components as
measured using U.S. data. To measure the labor factor, we use U.S. data on private consumption, government
consumption, output and aggregate hours worked. Notice that α and θ aﬀect the level of the labor factor,
but not its changes over time. For other calculations reported in the column "Data", we also use data
on female hours worked, taxes, gender wage gaps and fractions of single and married women in the total
population.
49Table 5: Comparison: Baseline Model and Other Experiments†




Data 13.31 2 5 .8 −36.56 .9
Experiments with Baseline Calibration
Baseline Model∗ 8.41 0 8 .3 −10.5 −4.3
O n eT i m e - V a r y i n gI n p u tO n l y
Gender wage gaps∗ 12.71 1 0 .8 −19.6 −4.6
Eﬀective labor income taxes −3.3 −7.71 2 .1 −3.2
Government consumption 2.76 .40 .0 −3.5
Fractions of households 5.94 .2 −6.8 −3.5
All Inputs Except Gender Wage Gaps∗ −0.3 −13.05 .7 −3.2
Other Experiments: All Time-Varying Inputs
Gender Gaps Due to Productivity (μ =1 ) 7 .41 0 8 .8 −7.8 −5.6
Reductions in Childcare Costs∗ 11.41 2 2 .0 −12.7 −5.1
†We perform a number of experiments under the baseline calibration. In the experiments with only a subset
of time-varying inputs, the households’ lump-sum transfers are distributed in the same proportions as in the
baseline model. Recalibrating the transfers does not change the results signiﬁcantly. In the experiment with
μ =1and the experiment with childcare costs, we recalibrate α and λf (to match the same targets on
hours worked as in the baseline calibration), but leave all other parameters unchanged. ∗The results from
experiments marked with a star are also plotted in Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6 respectively.
50